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IN SEARCH OF BUDDHIST VIRTUE: A CASE  





ABSTRACT: Classical presentations of the Buddhist path prescribe the cultivation of 
various good qualities that are necessary for spiritual progress, from mindfulness (sati) and 
loving-kindness (metta) to faith (saddhā) and wisdom (paññā). Examining the way in which 
such qualities are described and classified in early Buddhism—with special reference to their 
treatment in the Visuddhimagga (Path of Purification) by the fifth-century Buddhist thinker 
Buddhaghosa—the present article employs a comparative method in order to identify the 
Buddhist catalog of virtues. The first part sketches the characteristics of virtue as analyzed by 
neo-Aristotelian theories. Relying on these accounts, the second part considers three lists from 
early Buddhism as possible catalogs of virtue: (1) the components of ethical conduct (sīla), (2) 
the 37 factors that contribute to awakening (bodhipakkhiyā dhammā), and (3) the wholesome 
(kusala) or beautiful (sobhana) mental factors (cetasika). I then raise the question of why the 
Buddhist tradition developed several classifications of virtue, whereas the Western tradition of 
virtue ethics used a single category. Appealing to the connection between the virtues and living 
well (eudaimonia) in the eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics, I propose that one of the 
reasons why Buddhism developed multiple lists of virtues is its pluralistic acceptance of 
different modalities of living well and associated practices, in MacIntyre’s sense of the term. 
These modalities and practices are not equal, but are ordered hierarchically. Accordingly, I 
conclude that Buddhist ethics ought to be seen as a pluralist-gradualist system rather than a 
universalist theory. 
 




If Buddhist ethics is virtue ethics, then what are its virtues? Although the answer to this 
question seems all too obvious—qualities such as compassion, generosity, and patience 
immediately spring to mind—treatments of this problem in Buddhist philosophy are 
not as systematic as one might hope and therefore require further clarification 
(Tachibana 1926; reprint 1987, 57; Cooper and James 2005, 90–1). The present article 
will offer one such analysis by pursuing a comparative investigation that will rely on 
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neo-Aristotelian ethical theories in order to identify the closest Buddhist category to 
virtue. This inquiry will focus on three sets of good qualities that may constitute a 
Buddhist catalog of virtues, with reference to their treatment in The Path of Purification 
(Visuddhimagga), a formative text of the Theravāda tradition by the fifth-century CE 
Buddhist scholar Buddhaghosa. 1  I will argue that this inquiry’s findings carry 
implications for how Buddhist normative ethics is to be understood more broadly: 
rather than a universalist system—one which prescribes moral principles that are 
equally applicable to all moral agents—Buddhist ethics should be seen as a pluralistic 
and gradualist system.2 My reading will emphasize the link between possessing and 
exercising the virtues on the one hand and living well (eudaimonia) on the other. In the 
spectrum of virtue theories, then, the inquiry will depart from an understanding of 
Buddhism as a eudaimonistic theory (van Zyl 2015) as opposed to agent-based, 
sentimentalist, or care accounts of virtue ethics.3 Here, the eudaimonistic interpretation 
will serve as a hermeneutic model allowing an exploration of Buddhist ethics from a 
perspective that raises new questions about Buddhist normativity. I will not engage, 
however, in a defense of the aretaic interpretation of Buddhism.4 
The first part of the paper will map the contours of virtue as analyzed by neo-
Aristotelian thinkers in the late twentieth century, fleshing out earlier comparative 
analogies between Buddhist morality and virtue ethics.5 Philosophers such as Julia 
 
1 Translations are from Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga; trans. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli (1956; 4th edition 2010), 
with occasional modifications. 
2 As will become clear, the version of virtue ethics that I will attribute to Buddhism is pluralistic in the 
sense that it acknowledges multiple legitimate conceptions of living well (eudaimonia) and virtuous 
moral character rather than in Christine Swanton’s (2003 and 2015) sense of admitting more than one 
foundation of virtue; in Swanton’s taxonomy, my reading of Buddhist ethics is in fact monist in that it 
adheres to one ground of virtue only: the good for an individual (Swanton 2015, 213). Nor, in this case, 
is it pluralistic in Edelglass’s (2006) sense of the term—that is, in giving equal weight to elements from 
different moral theories, Aristotelian, Kantian, and utilitarian—as the reading that I will present focuses 
on virtue ethics alone. Similarly, this version is gradualist in its prescription of different, progressively 
evaluated modalities of its virtue theory which take into consideration the agent’s moral development 
(as noted by MacKenzie 2018a, 165) rather than in the sense of Peter Harvey’s suggestion that Buddhism 
prescribes norms from different moral theories (referring, like Edelglass, to Aristotelian, Kantian, and 
utilitarian theories) according to the agent’s level of maturity (Harvey 2000, 51). 
3 On the agent-based, sentimentalist, and care variations of virtue ethics, see Slote 2001; Frazer and Slote 
2015; and Noddings 2015, respectively. 
4 Virtue ethical readings of Buddhism have been advanced by Keown 1992; Cooper and James 2005; 
Sahni 2007; Fink 2013; and, more recently, MacKenzie 2018a. I am inclined to agree with interpreters 
like Clayton (2006), who hold that Buddhism (in this case, even within its early strata) embraces ethical 
ideas that are the hallmarks of more than one Western moral tradition. Consequently, in this paper my 
approach is closer to Vasen 2014 and Vasen 2018, in which virtue ethics is applied as a hermeneutical 
framework rather than a definite view of the nature of normative Buddhist ethics.  
5 The two core concepts of Greek and Hellenistic ethics are the ideas of living well and virtue (aretê), 
yet it is the former that has received the bulk of attention in modern studies of Buddhist ethics (most 
notably in Keown 1992, 196–203, and Cooper and James 2005, 68–73; cf. Collins 1998, who refers to 
the possible analogy between eudaimonia and the Buddhist states of Nibbāna and Brahmā world, though 
he largely rejects it). Studies that embarked upon an effort to locate the Buddhist catalog of virtues can 
be seen to employ three main methods of inquiry. The constructive approach, taken by scholars like 
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Annas and Philippa Foot offer a historical account of virtue derived from Greek and 
Hellenistic philosophy, whereas Alasdair MacIntyre, in his influential study After 
Virtue, distills a theory of virtue that aims to be applicable to any aretaic system, in any 
tradition or historical period. Both descriptions are illuminating when used as a lens for 
analyzing Buddhist virtues. Building on these foundations, the paper will examine three 
key, ethically relevant lists which are treated in the Visuddhimagga and whose items 
display, to a greater or lesser degree, the philosophical characteristics of virtue. In the 
final part, I will suggest that early Buddhism propounds multiple sets of virtues because 
it also recognizes different conceptions of living well and practices, indicating that the 
nature of this virtue theory is pluralist and gradualist. 
 
1. NEO-ARISTOTELIAN ANATOMIES OF VIRTUE 
 
There are two currents that are particularly notable in the wake of renewed twentieth-
century interest in virtue ethics. One sketches a historical notion of virtue drawing on 
Greek and Hellenistic philosophy, while the other devises a modern theory of virtue 
that sets out to offer an alternative to the hegemonic utilitarian and deontological 
systems. For both accounts, the diverse nature of this notion presents a significant 
complexity. Ancient thinkers defined virtue in different, sometimes contradictory ways 
and were divided on which qualities were to be included in the catalog of virtues. 
Although the majority of them agreed on the inclusion of the four cardinal virtues—
courage, temperance, practical wisdom, and justice—differences arose regarding their 
relative importance, how they should be interpreted, and the manner in which they are 
acquired. This challenge is more insistently faced by modern accounts, as they consider 
an even wider range of historical concepts—stretching into modernity—in their attempt 
to reveal the ethical relevance of these concepts to contemporary times. 
The question then arises as to whether the difficulties that ensue from the variety of 
views can be overcome. Responding to this question, thinkers like Julia Annas (1993) 
and Philippa Foot (1978) draw an outline of virtue that is common to many of the 
classical theories which specifically relies on Aristotle’s analysis of this concept. 
According to Annas, the classical version of virtue underscores three main aspects of 
this idea: (1) virtue is a stable disposition to act, which exists in the soul and involves 
choices; (2) it has an affective aspect, measured according to the virtuous agent’s ability 
to do the right thing with little or no internal opposition; and (3) it has an intellectual 
 
Buddhist moral teachings, alongside relevant idioms, notes, and doctrines from various scriptures, we 
can distill a set of good qualities that represent Buddhism’s set of virtues. The single list method, 
followed by Keown 1992 and Sahni 2007, calls upon the intuition that if Buddhism provides a repository 
of qualities to be developed by a virtuous practitioner, then these qualities must be classified under a 
clearly defined category, one that is produced by the tradition itself, but which also shares certain features 
with other philosophical and religious concepts of virtue. Finally, the moral ideal method, adopted by 
MacKenzie 2018a, proposes that a useful way to arrive at a list of Buddhist virtues is to concentrate on 
those qualities which partly constitute the awakened state of a Buddha, or, in other words, to take the 
moral ideal of Buddhism as the source from which its virtues can be derived. Here, I will seek to preserve 
the basic intuition of the single list approach: that the Buddhist catalog of virtues is to be found in a 




Comparative Philosophy 12.2 (2021)  HANNER 
 
61 
aspect, consisting in the agent’s coherent understanding of the reasons for acting 
virtuously based on reflection and self-examination. 
According to Annas, Aristotle offers the most elaborate clarification of the first 
aspect. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he carries out an examination which is intended to 
reveal the nature of virtues. Taking it as a given that virtue is a thing that is “found in 
the soul”, he claims that there are three things that can be described in this way: feelings, 
such as appetite, anger, fear, confidence, and the like—“in general things accompanied 
by pleasure or pain” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1105b; trans. and ed. Crisp 2000); 
capacities, “the things on the basis of which we are described as being capable of 
experiencing these feelings—on the basis of which, for example, we are described as 
capable of feeling anger, fear or pity” (ibid.); and states,  
 
those things in respect of which we are well or badly disposed in relation to feelings. If, for 
example, in relation to anger, we feel it too much or too little, we are badly disposed; but 
if we are between the two, then well disposed. (ibid.) 
 
Virtue, then, belongs to one of these three categories.  
Aristotle rules out the possibility that virtue is a feeling for two reasons: first, we 
are morally evaluated for having or lacking virtues, but never for having feelings; 
second (clarifying the first reason), feelings are not a matter of deliberate, rational 
choice. In his typical way of approaching philosophical issues by appealing to common 
beliefs, Aristotle notes that when we have feelings, we are said to be moved by them, 
whereas the moral virtues do not move us, but are rather our states. In modern terms, 
Annas writes, “we are not responsible for the way we feel, since it is not entirely under 
our control; but we are responsible for being virtuous or depraved, and praised or 
blamed accordingly” (Annas 1993, 49). Thus, virtue must have an affinity not only to 
our feelings, but also to the way in which we manage them. In other words, virtues and 
vices are the manner in which a person makes himself and how he chooses to be. 
Next, Aristotle examines the capacities and arrives at a similar conclusion. The 
virtues cannot be capacities for a similar reason: we are not morally evaluated on the 
basis of our capacities, Aristotle argues, since we possess them by nature, but “we do 
not become good or bad by nature” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106a). In other 
words, the virtues are not part of the fundamental constitution with which we are born. 
What makes us good or bad, and accordingly, what we may be praised or blamed for, 
is the way in which we handle the given facts of our life out of deliberate choice. Since 
we are not sufficiently responsible for our feelings or capacities, they cannot constitute 
virtues. Aristotle concludes, by a process of elimination, that virtue is a state (hexis). 
However, Annas comments,  
 
in some ways Aristotle’s word hexis answers better to our word “disposition” than to 
“state”: a virtue like courage is a disposition because it is a condition because of which I 
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Importantly, moral virtue as a disposition is characterized by being intentional. 
Aristotle defines virtue as a state that involves choice, and this is true in two senses: 
first, it is built up from repeated choices, and second, it is exercised in making a choice. 
In this, Annas argues, virtue is different from habit, which is built up mindlessly, 
without deliberation or decision (51). 
Virtue is not only a disposition to act in certain ways, but also a state that concerns 
the agent’s character, feelings, and emotions. This is its affective aspect. A virtuous 
person’s character is considered to be developed to the extent that he knows the right 
thing to do in each moment and takes pleasure in doing it. Committing a wrong-doing, 
at the same time, repels those who possess a developed character, and they are not 
tempted to pursue such courses of action (55). Greek and Hellenistic philosophers 
distinguish between those who do the right thing but need to struggle with their feelings 
and those who do the right thing without experiencing any conflict; that is, they act 
wholeheartedly and take pleasure in the action. This distinction between the two types 
of moral agents is considered to reflect different levels of ethical maturity. The latter 
type is deemed more advanced from an ethical point of view. In addition, the affective 
aspect of virtue refers to the view that an agent’s capacity to regulate his feelings and 
emotions through the cultivation of virtue correlates with his ability to perceive the 
right thing to do. The intellectual knowledge that a certain action is virtuous is not 
sufficient, according to Annas’s analysis. Changes in ethical belief have to take root in 
the agent’s emotional life in order for them to manifest in his behavior. The virtuous 
person, then, not only does the right thing, but also has the right kind of emotion with 
respect to what he does (54). 
In this regard, Philippa Foot (1978) adds that virtues have a corrective role, being 
responsible for the proper regulation of our emotions. Each virtue stands at a point 
where there is a temptation to be resisted or a deficiency of motivation to be rectified. 
Courage stands at the point at which fear operates as a temptation; temperance stands 
at the point at which the desire for pleasure constitutes a temptation. In fact, Foot’s 
claim is that virtues only exist because vices—for instance, fear or the desire for 
pleasure—operate as temptations. Often, we want to run away not only when this is the 
right thing to do, but also when we should combat a threat; we wish to enjoy pleasures 
not only when it is appropriate to do so, but also when it is not. If human nature had 
been different, Foot observes, there would have been no need for these corrective 
dispositions, since fear and pleasure would have served as excellent guides to behavior 
(9). Other virtues, such as justice, are there to correct deficiencies of motivation. Justice, 
according to Foot, does not correlate with any particular disposition or desire to be 
restrained, since many different desires and dispositions may lead to injustice. Instead, 
justice corresponds to a deficiency in motivation that is in need of rectification. This, 
then, is the affective aspect, according to Foot: virtue is necessary in the light of 
emotional temptations and deficiencies of motivation that affect human beings, and its 
role is to correct them. 
Finally, virtue has an intellectual aspect. Annas explains that alongside its affinity 
to our feelings and emotions, virtue requires an intellectual understanding and a 
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the morally right thing, or even does it stably and reliably”, she writes. “She is the 
person who understands the principles on which she acts, and thus can explain and 
defend her actions” (Annas 1993, 67, emphasis in original). In other words, virtue rests 
on an understanding or knowledge of those principles that underlie moral action. In 
order to be virtuous, the moral agent needs to engage in a process of reflection and 
thereby achieve a unified grasp of the general principles that form the basis of his 
patterns of action and decision-making. In Greek philosophy, this intellectual element 
is frequently illustrated by an analogy to expertise or skill (technê). Virtue, like the 
expert’s mastery of sculpture or carpentry, is the point at which the agent reaches an 
intellectual grasp of the universal, of that which is common to particular cases. The 
expert is capable of forming a reliable judgment with regard to what he does; or, in 
other words, he is capable of providing reasons for doing things this way rather than 
another or why a certain craft is better than another. Similarly, the virtuous agent has a 
unified or coherent understanding of his expertise; i.e., the domain of each of the virtues. 
In addition to these three aspects, it is important to underline that in eudaimonistic 
virtue theories, the value of virtues lies in their close connection to living well, which 
is their final end. “Cultivating the virtues is worthwhile”, writes Annas, “because living 
virtuously will constitute my living my life as a whole in a way that lives it well, in a 
way which it is valuable to live” (2006, 520, emphasis in original). It is virtues, then, 
that enable the attainment of a well-lived life. 
While Annas’s and Foot’s descriptions of virtue stem from ancient philosophy, 
Alasdair MacIntyre sets out a modern virtue theory that engages in ethical problems 
emerging from modern and post-modern thought. In his book After Virtue (1981; 3rd 
edition 2007), he paints a gloomy picture of the state of modern moral discourse, which 
fails to measure up to rational lines. Virtue theory, MacIntyre believes, may remedy 
the shortcomings of this discourse. His theory is intended to be applicable to 
conceptions of virtue from different places and times: those of Homer, Aristotle, the 
Stoics, and Epicurus; Christian and medieval views; and virtue as theorized by early 
modern thinkers such as David Hume and Baruch Spinoza. According to MacIntyre, 
the variety of conceptions does not impede the identification of common essential 
features. Starting from this assertion, he advances a thesis that relies partly on a 
philosophical inquiry and partly on insights from sociology and also offers a template 
designed to fit different understandings of virtue. 
One of the characteristics of virtue, according to MacIntyre, is that its realization 
requires a prior understanding of certain features of social and moral life—an 
understanding in terms of which the concept of virtue is defined and explained. In 
Aristotle’s thought, for example, the concept of virtue is subordinate to the concept of 
living well, which is identified as the telos of human activity, while in Homer’s works, 
virtue is subordinate to the concept of social role. MacIntyre seeks to develop this 
insight into an understanding of the general foundation that is required for an 
understanding of virtue. To do so, he relies on two background notions—“practice”, as 
the framework in which virtue manifests, and “the narrative unity of human life”, which 
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MacIntyre describes the social and moral backdrop of the virtues using the notion 
of practice. His main claim is that a particular type of practice provides the arena in 
which the virtues are exhibited and in terms of which they are defined. MacIntyre’s 
definition of this idea comprises several elements: 
 
By a “practice” I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended. (187) 
 
This passage needs to be unpacked. First, what is meant by a “coherent and complex 
form of socially established cooperative human activity”? MacIntyre does not elaborate 
on this, but he does mention several examples: the games of football and chess; the 
inquiries of physics, chemistry, and biology; and the work of the historian, the painter, 
and the musician. These examples show that a practice is not only a framework of moral 
activity. Rather, any socially established cooperative human activity, such as research 
or multiplayer games—and for our purposes, a spiritual or religious path—is a practice, 
and the conceptual framework of virtues (in the ethical sense of the word, as opposed 
to the virtues of the athlete or artist) is but one of them. 
Through participation in a practice, the goods internal to it are achieved. MacIntyre 
distinguishes between external and internal goods. External goods are those which are 
contingently attached to the practice according to social circumstances, as in 
MacIntyre’s example of a child who learns to play chess despite having no particular 
desire to play the game and who is offered sweets in order to encourage him to play 
and win. Motivated in this way, the child plays and does so in order to win, but as long 
as it is only the sweets that give him a reason to play, he does not have any reason not 
to cheat. The sweets are external goods. By contrast, internal goods cannot be achieved 
in any other way than through the practice itself. They are internal in two senses: they 
can only be described using terms afforded by the practice and they can be recognized 
and known only on the basis of the experience gained through participating in that 
practice. Those who lack experience in the relevant practice are incapable of evaluating 
its internal goods. An important difference between the two types of goods is that 
external goods are such that when they are achieved, they become the property of a 
particular individual, whereas internal goods are such that achieving them benefits the 
entire practice community. 
The distinction between external and internal goods allows for an initial definition 
of virtues: “A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which 
tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack 
of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods” (191). According to 
MacIntyre, three virtues are essential for the achievement of internal goods in any 
practice. These are justice, courage, and honesty, which are necessary because a person 
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the goods that are internal to the practice. Each practice requires a particular kind of 
relationship to exist between its participants. Anyone who participates in the practice 
needs to learn to recognize who deserves what (justice), to take upon himself the risks 
he may face along the path (courage), and to be attentive to what others say about his 
inadequacies and to reply with attention to the facts (honesty). These virtues are 
necessary for the maintenance of those types of relationships that enable the practice. 
At this point, MacIntyre introduces the second background idea: the narrative unity 
of human life. A central role of the virtues in pre-modern ethical systems was to make 
the individual’s life a unified one. Thus, MacIntyre claims, we ought to ask whether it 
is  
 
rationally justifiable to conceive of each human life as a unity, so that we may try to specify 
each such life as having its good and so that we may understand the virtues as having their 
function in enabling an individual to make of his or her life one kind of unity rather than 
another. (203)  
 
While the answer to this question was self-evident to thinkers of the pre-modern 
eudaimonistic tradition, MacIntyre observes that in contemporary times, any attempt 
to imagine human life as a whole, which would give the virtues an adequate telos, 
encounters philosophical and social obstacles (204). The social obstacles emerge from 
the way in which modernity split human life into fragments—work and leisure, private 
and public life, childhood, middle age, and old age—with each fragment having its 
norms and expected set of behaviors. The philosophical obstacles originate in analytical 
philosophy, which has adopted the tendencies to think about human action in atomistic 
terms and to analyze complex actions and transactions in terms of simple components, 
as well as in existentialism, which divorces the individual from the roles he fulfills, to 
the point that life resembles a series of unconnected episodes. 
This fragmentation of the self renders the virtues meaningless, as a self that is 
separated from its roles is stripped of the foundation of social human relationships in 
which the virtues operate. Similarly, MacIntyre claims, it is not possible to isolate 
human action and understand it outside of its context. A single segment of a given 
human behavior can be characterized in various different ways depending on the 
intention underlying it, which in turn cannot be understood independently of the 
sequence of actions in which it is embedded or its cultural, social, and historical 
background. Without getting into the minute details of MacIntyre’s philosophical move, 
his conclusion is that “narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and 
essential genre for the characterization of human actions” (208) and that “man is in his 
actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal” (216). 
The narrative to which MacIntyre refers is our life story, the connection that we make 
between our actions over time, from birth to life to death. Only in this way, on the basis 
of our and others’ narratives and the relationships between them, do our actions take 
on their meaning. Furthermore, the narrative is the thread running through an 
individual’s life, creating its unity. Above all, this narrative enables us to determine the 
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that is created by the narrative gives human life its meaning, and from this meaning, 
the virtues are derived. 
It is in this way that MacIntyre departs from the broad concept of a practice, which 
includes the game of football, the inquiry of physics, and so on, and centers the 
discussion on ethical practice, for the virtues which make it possible to acquire the 
goods that are internal to the practice are the same dispositions that will sustain us in 
our quest for our personal and human good, as expressed in our narrative. Their role is 
to enable us to overcome the misfortunes, dangers, temptations, and distractions that 
we will encounter along the path. 
 
2. BUDDHIST CATALOGS OF VIRTUES 
 
The principle that will guide my next inquiry is that Buddhist virtue, if it is to be 
recognized as such, has to meet one or more of the two descriptions given in the 
previous section; that is, it is either (1) a good mental disposition, which has an affective 
dimension (a corrective function with respect to our emotions, etc.) and an intellectual 
dimension (an encapsulation of a rational justification for its being virtuous that rests 
on a coherent understanding of the ground for moral judgment), or, following 
MacIntyre, (2) an acquired human trait whose possession and exercise enable the agent 
to acquire the goods that are internal to Buddhist practice, according to the Buddhist 
definition of human good.6 To this, I would like to add a second condition: the list of 
Buddhist virtues should be exhaustive and mutually exclusive; that is, it will not omit 
any virtue endorsed by Buddhist thought, and, of course, will not include any item 
which is not a virtue. Buddhist literature formulates its teachings, including its ethical 
teachings, using a multitude of lists, whose number reaches several hundred (Gethin 
1992; reprint 2001, 20). Here, I have chosen to examine, in broad strokes, only three 
canonical lists from the early strata of Buddhism: (1) the components of ethical conduct 
(sīla), (2) the 37 factors that contribute to awakening (bodhipakkhiyā dhammā), and (3) 
the wholesome (kusala) or beautiful (sobhana) mental factors (cetasika). I will center 
on these lists because they are both interesting from an ethical point of view and aim 
to present a comprehensive analysis of what can be seen as the moral virtues of early 
Buddhism. 
The Buddhist practice which is probably most identified with an ethical system is 
the practice of sīla. Sīla is rendered in English in various ways, including “virtue” 
(Harvey 2000), “morality” or “moral conduct” (Keown 1992; Heim 2020), and “moral 
discipline” (Bodhi 2005; Śāntideva 2016). It is considered to be the moral aspect of 
both the Noble Eightfold Path—subsuming Right Speech, Right Action, and Right 
Livelihood—and the six perfections of the Bodhisattva. Its portrayal in the 
Visuddhimagga is one of several different expositions in the Buddhist corpus. 7 
 
6 For further comparison between Buddhist ethics and MacIntyre’s thought in After Virtue, see Vasen 
2014 and Vasen 2018. 
7 On the understanding of sīla in the Pāli canon, see Keown 1992, 25–56; on the notion of śīla in 
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Buddhaghosa opens his discussion of sīla with a number of questions that are relevant 
to the present inquiry: What is sīla? In what sense is it sīla? What are its characteristic, 
function, manifestation, and proximate cause? How many kinds of sīla are there (I.16)? 
In reply to the question of what sīla is, he gives the following definition: 
 
It is the states beginning with volition (cetanā) present in one who abstains from killing 
living things, etc., or in one who fulfils the practice of the duties. For this is said in the 
Paṭisambhidā: “What is sīla? There is sīla as volition (cetanā), sīla as consciousness-
concomitant (cetasika), sīla as restraint (saṃvara), sīla as non-transgression (avītikkama).” 
(I.17) 
 
We may note that Buddhaghosa weaves together various motifs from the domain of 
moral theory, and the mention of action as a defining feature of sīla particularly stands 
out. Actions such as abstaining from killing—and by this, Buddhaghosa means 
abstention from the 10 unwholesome actions (dasa-akusala-kammapathā), as we will 
see later on—define those states which are sīla. Similarly, the passage mentions the set 
of duties to be fulfilled—here, Buddhaghosa alludes to moral precepts such as the 
vinaya—and it, too, is used to describe the states in question. However, at the beginning 
of the definition stand volition or intending (cetanā) and mental factors (cetasika). Sīla, 
then, is defined as the cetanā or cetasikas of those who abstain from negative actions 
and fulfill their duties; the root of morality is mental intentionality. 
Consequently, it seems that sīla is characterized by at least one element in the 
definitions of virtue: it denotes a group of states or dispositions. These are the intentions 
of a person who guards the 10 wholesome actions—the counterparts of the 
unwholesome actions—and fulfills his duties. Indeed, later in the chapter, 
Buddhaghosa indicates that he sees sīla as a disposition, when he writes:  
 
But in the world the nature of such and such beings is called their disposition (sīla) of 
which they say: “This one is of happy sīla, this one is of unhappy sīla, this one is of 
quarrelsome sīla, this one is of dandified sīla.” (I.38)  
 
After he defines sīla, Buddhaghosa turns to describing its characteristics and nature, 
where we find another parallel with the Western notion of virtue: 
 
Just as visibleness is the characteristic of the visible-data base … so also this same 
composing, described above as the coordinating of bodily action, etc., and as the foundation 
of wholesome factors (kusalā dhammā), is the characteristic of sīla …. While such is its 
characteristic: 
 
Its function has a double sense: 
Action to stop misconduct, then 
Achievement as the quality 
Of blamelessness in virtuous men. 
 
Blo-bzan-grags-pa 1986, 1–46; for further analysis of sīla in Buddhaghosa, see Heim 2013, 113–6, and 








So what is called sīla should be understood to have the function (nature) of stopping 
misconduct. (I.20–1, emphasis in original) 
 
That is, sīla is described as a habit that participates in behavioral, and consequently 
emotional, correction. Its essential function is opposing misconduct and it establishes 
the purity of the virtuous person. Of the three aspects mentioned by Annas—
dispositional, emotional, and intellectual—it appears that sīla meets the first two. 
However, if we pay attention to the first part of the paragraph, we will notice that it 
contains another, somewhat different description of sīla, which may cast doubt on our 
initial conclusion: sīla, Buddhaghosa tells us, is the foundation of wholesome factors. 
If so, is sīla the moral disposition itself, or rather merely a means of forming a moral 
disposition? Should we regard the varieties of sīla as virtues, or is their function nothing 
more than to assist in the cultivation of virtues? 
One possible answer is that sīla has both functions. It may be argued that sīla has a 
double meaning: on the one hand, it is the wholesome disposition itself; on the other, 
it produces the disposition. This makes sense if we assume that every human action 
contributes to the development of an equivalent habit (as Aristotle and Annas hold)—
and this, of course, is a premise of Buddhist karman theory. A violent deed, for instance, 
results from a violent intention and at the same time leads to the habit of acting violently 
in the future. Indeed, this can be understood from the way Buddhaghosa points to sīla’s 
double meaning in the following etymological analysis: 
 
In what sense is it sīla? It is sīla in the sense of composing (sīlana). What is this composing? 
It is either a coordinating (samādhāna), meaning non-inconsistency of bodily action, etc., 
due to virtuousness; or it is an upholding (upadhāraṇa), meaning a state of basis (ādhāra) 
owing to its serving as foundation for wholesome factors. For those who understand 
etymology admit only those two meanings. (I.141) 
 
The first meaning of sīla is the “composing” or “coordinating” of bodily and vocal 
actions—that is, moral behavior—while in its second sense, it is the support of 
wholesome mental states, or, in other words, that which establishes them. 
The next question that Buddhaghosa raises, which he answers at great length, is 
how many kinds of sīla there are. He proposes to classify the kinds of sīla in several 
ways, and in the course of his classification, he clarifies the meaning of sīla in practice; 
that is, what it means to live in accordance with sīla (I.25–141). As the text advances, 
sīla reveals its deontological dimension and Buddhaghosa stresses the observance of 
precepts or moral duties. This latter sense overshadows the initial sense that sīla 
receives in the definition; namely, the intending underlying the action. In a twofold 
division, Buddhaghosa distinguishes between sīla as a manner of keeping and avoiding 
(cāritta-vāritta). “‘This should be done’ is keeping; not doing what is prohibited … 
‘This should not be done’ is avoiding”, he writes (I.26, emphasis in original). The next 
twofold division relates to minimal rules of conduct (abhisamācārika) and fundamental 
rules of conduct (ādibrahmacariyaka), which include the self-liberation (pātimokkha) 
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conduct that originate from family or local customs, and so on (I.41). Although all of 
this appears to imply that sīla is a deontological principle, if we take Buddhaghosa’s 
early comments into account I would claim that in its essence sīla is an internal state 
that manifests and is cultivated through action. This reading presupposes a close 
proximity between the language of virtues and the language of human behavior (Fink 
2013, 670) and suggests that virtue can be defined, as well as exemplified, by recourse 
to the types of action it motivates. 
The second candidate for a Buddhist catalog of virtues to be examined is the list of 
37 factors that contribute to awakening (bodhipakkhiyā dhammā). At first glance, this 
collection of states seems to constitute an exhaustive list of Buddhist virtues, for two 
main reasons: first, in the post-canonical literature, the factors that contribute to 
awakening are equated with the entire spiritual path (magga; Gethin 1992; reprint 2001, 
23), and as such, this scheme is by definition the most comprehensive list of factors; 
second, the reason why the items are included in the list is that cultivating them assists 
one in acquiring important goods that are internal to Buddhist practice—above all, 
wisdom and awakening. According to Buddhaghosa, all 37 factors are present in a 
single mind moment at the time in which the four knowledges of the stream-enterer, 
the once-returner, the non-returner, and the arahant arise (Buddhaghosa, 
Visuddhimagga, XXII.39). Although the expression “factors that contribute to 
awakening” only rarely appears in the Pāli Nikāyas, in later commentarial literature it 
is employed as a general concept that signifies the essence of the practice of the 
Buddha’s teachings. The list is a combination of seven different groups of factors, 
which are scattered throughout the three baskets of the Pāli canon and which were 
consolidated into the broader scheme only in later commentarial works. 
These are the seven groups: 8  (1) The four foundations of mindfulness (sati-
paṭṭhāna), which comprise awareness of the body (rūpa), feelings (vedanā), the mind 
(citta), and mental objects (dhammā). This prevalent scheme is a complete array of 
meditative practices that are intended for the development of mindfulness and have the 
essence of mindful contemplation of phenomena. (2) The four right efforts (samma-
ppadhāna)—likewise familiar from numerous early sources—include the effort to 
eradicate unwholesome states of mind which have arisen, the effort to prevent the 
arising of unwholesome states which have not yet arisen, the effort to develop 
wholesome states which have not yet arisen, and the effort to preserve existing 
wholesome states. This fourfold division is comparable to Right Effort (sammā-
vāyāma), the sixth component of the Noble Eightfold Path. (3) The four bases of 
success (iddhi-pāda) are the desire to act (chanda), strength (viriya), the mind (citta), 
and investigation (vīmaṃsā). The application of these four elements leads to success in 
meditative practices and also to supernormal powers (Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, 
XII.50–3). 
The following two groups are (4) the five spiritual faculties (indriya) and (5) the 
five spiritual powers (bala), which call for special care in the present context. The two 
 
8 Gethin 1992; reprint 2001 offers a thorough study of these factors and their formulations in the Pāli 
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are identical in terms of their five constituents—confidence (saddhā), strength (viriya), 
mindfulness (sati), concentration (samādhi), and wisdom (paññā)—but they do not 
have the same status. The faculties are seen as items which exercise control in their 
own domains: confidence governs the sphere of commitment (adhimokkha), strength 
the sphere of “taking on” (paggaha), mindfulness the sphere of “standing near” 
(upaṭṭhāna), concentration the sphere of non-distraction (avikkhepa), and wisdom the 
sphere of seeing (dassana), while the powers are the very same items being stable and 
deemed undefeatable by their opponents, which are distrust (assaddhiye akampiyaṃ), 
laziness (kosajja), heedlessness (pamāda), agitation (uddhacca), and ignorance (avijjā) 
respectively.  
In the context of classical Indian thought, the concept of indriya should be 
understood as an entity or capacity which exerts a certain kind of power, strength, 
influence, or control over its domain. In classical Indian philosophical literature, it 
usually denotes the five sense organs—the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body—and 
oftentimes, albeit not always, the mind is added as the sixth sense organ. In Buddhist 
thought, the full classical list of faculties includes 22 entries. These are subsumed under 
five groups, the first of which is the aforementioned list of sense faculties. Another 
group is the set of spiritual faculties, which appears in the list of 37 factors that 
contribute to awakening. Another central group of items characterized as indriyas is 
the set of feeling faculties, with five items: the pleasure faculty, the pain faculty, the 
joy faculty, the grief faculty, and the equanimity faculty (XVI.1). What all these 
indriyas have in common, according to the Pāli Nikāyas, as well as the commentarial 
tradition, is that each of the faculties functions as a ruler (XVI.4–5). 
At this point, we can return to the main question of whether the list of 37 factors 
can serve as a Buddhist category of virtues. In my opinion, the last analysis shows that 
the indriyas do not meet the definition of virtue, and for this reason, neither does the 
list of 37 factors as a whole. Why are the indriyas not virtues? First, the semantic field 
to which the term belongs—that of “capacity”, “strength”, and “power”—distinguishes 
them from virtues. Virtue is a habit or disposition to think or act in a certain way rather 
than an ever-present faculty. Additionally, the philosophical characterization in early 
and commentarial texts implies that an indriya is not a disposition or state 
characterizing a particular individual; rather, it is common to all beings (unless they are 
impaired, of course) whether they choose to have these faculties or not and whether 
they cultivate them or not. The list includes capacities that we possess from birth. 
Above all, it seems that a more appropriate analogy would be between the categories 
of indriya and bala and the Aristotelian category of capacities. Recall that Aristotle 
does not accept any mental element over which we do not exercise choice as a virtue. 
He justifies this claim by noting that we are not morally praised or blamed for what we 
cannot choose (that is, our capacities and feelings). Indeed, the sense organs with which 
we are born, just like the capacity to feel pleasure or pain, are things over which we do 
not exercise choice and, accordingly, for which we are not subject to moral judgment. 
Indriyas are better described as “things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of 
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The list of 37 factors, although not a pure catalog of virtues, is interesting as it 
reveals a complexity with regard to recognizing such a Buddhist classification—a 
complexity that results from the frequent reoccurrence of good qualities in different 
categories. This problematic is distinctly exhibited by the final two groups: (6) the 
seven members of awakening (bojjhaṅga) and (7) the Noble Eightfold Path. The 
members of awakening are a set of qualities that lead to spiritual liberation, and they 
include mindfulness (sati), discrimination of dhamma (dhamma-vicaya), strength 
(viriya), joy (pīti), tranquility (passaddhi), concentration (samādhi), and equanimity 
(upekkhā). Three of the seven members have already been observed in the previous 
groups and carry similar meanings: the mindfulness member of awakening is 
equivalent to the mindfulness indriya, the mindfulness bala, and the four foundations 
of mindfulness; the strength member of awakening is equivalent to the strength indriya 
and the strength bala, Right Effort, and the four right efforts; and the concentration 
member of awakening is equivalent to the concentration indriya, the concentration bala, 
and Right Concentration (sammā-samādhi) of the Eightfold Path. 
Two of the members partly overlap items in other groups covered above. 
Discrimination of dhamma is an alternative formulation of the wisdom indriya and the 
wisdom bala, whose particular meaning is derived from the conceptual world of 
Abhidhamma literature. As an indriya, wisdom concerns the realization of the four 
noble truths, but the term “discrimination of dhamma” points to the connection between 
Dharma as the corpus of Buddhist teachings and dhammas, the components of the 
teachings, as Rupert Gethin has established on several occasions (1992, 147–54; 2004). 
Similarly, equanimity is a term that is pregnant with meaning in early Buddhist thought. 
Apart from being one of the seven members of awakening, upekkhā can frequently be 
found in the Pāli canon in the context of the aggregate of feelings (vedanā), meditative 
absorptions (jhāna), and the four divine abidings (brahma-vihāra), which will also be 
mentioned below. Used in the present context, equanimity represents a balance with 
respect to phenomena (dhammas) that arise simultaneously. Finally, two other 
members are entirely distinct: joy, as a member of awakening, denotes an emotional 
satisfaction that is intrinsic to the spiritual life and is specifically associated with the 
process in which the mind becomes satisfied and tranquil, while tranquility is closely 
linked to joy, but is described as a bodily experience. 
The Noble Eightfold Path, being a fundamental teaching of early Buddhism, does 
not require further elaboration here, but one point to note, once again, is the 
reoccurrence in this context of moral elements that appear elsewhere in the list of 37 
factors or in other places, such as in the category of sīla. As mentioned, Right Effort 
has the same function as the four right efforts and the strength member of awakening, 
Right Concentration has a similar role to that of the concentration member of 
awakening, and the three trainings of Right Speech, Right Action, and Right Livelihood 
encompass, according to Buddhaghosa, the purview of sīla. 
With this in mind, can the list of 37 factors be seen as a Buddhist catalog of virtues? 
At first glance, the answer must be negative. The list contains entries with the functions 
and features of innate capacities rather than virtue. However, this verdict ought to be 
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they are seen in this way, some of the sub-lists may nevertheless serve as virtues. For 
example, the four foundations of mindfulness are a detailed description of mindfulness, 
and the four strengths are an elaboration of the idea of strength (viriya). Both 
mindfulness and strength are wholesome mental factors, which may be acknowledged 
as Buddhist virtues (Keown 1992, 63; Sahni 2007, 109–13). Examined in this light, the 
list of 37 factors constitutes a partial catalog—a scheme that provides us with some of 
the virtues of early Buddhism, while including other factors that are not virtues. 
The third and final category that I will examine comes from Abhidhamma literature, 
whose categories, according to Damien Keown, shed light on the nature of Buddhist 
ethics (1992, 58). More specifically, within the conceptual framework of the 
Abhidhamma, Keown maintains that the classification of wholesome factors (kusala 
dhamma) and unwholesome factors (akusala dhamma) are the closest to the Western 
concepts of virtues and vices respectively (63).9 This view is supported by Pragati 
Sahni (2007, 109–13). Of the many kinds of factors that make up the person in the 
Abhidhamma analysis, those belonging to the groups of minds (citta) and mental 
factors (cetasika) are particularly pertinent, as they may be evaluated as morally 
wholesome or unwholesome. The Theravāda Abhidhamma system recognizes 89 
classes of mind, of which 21 are wholesome. The causal roots of the wholesome factors 
are non-desire (alobha), non-hatred (adosa), and non-delusion (amoha), whereas the 
unwholesome factors are rooted in desire (lobha), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha). 
Mental factors are basic mental entities that accompany the main mind. According to 
the Theravāda Abhidhamma, they consist of 52 kinds and are either wholesome, 
unwholesome, or morally neutral. 
Sahni enumerates 14 unwholesome mental factors which she recognizes as the 
Buddhist vices (111)—including confusion (moha), immodesty (ahirika), 
unscrupulousness (anottappa), and restlessness (uddhacca)—and 12 wholesome 
cetasikas (out of the 25 mentioned in Theravāda sources)—including faith (saddhā), 
mindfulness (sati), modesty (hiri), scrupulousness (ottappa), Right Speech (sammā-
vācā), Right Action (sammā-kammanta), Right Livelihood (sammā-ājīva), compassion 
(karuṇā), and sympathetic joy (muditā). The list of wholesome mental factors has many 
of the characteristics expected from a catalog of virtues: the factors are good mental 
states; they are important qualities that assist a person in obtaining the goods internal 
to the spiritual path; some of them are opposites of unwholesome mental factors and, 
as such, oppose and correct the latter; and we are subject to moral evaluation on their 
basis. It is interesting to note that much like the 37 factors, the list of wholesome mental 
factors includes elements listed in other moral schemes, such as the four divine abidings 
(compassion and sympathetic joy) and the seven members of awakening (tranquility 
and equanimity). In other words, the list of mental factors, while mutually exclusive, 
partly overlaps other sets of virtues.  
 
9 Of particular relevance and interest is the fact that Keown bases his claim on Foot’s and MacIntyre’s 
accounts of virtue. This pertinent analysis, coupled with the observations presented in this article, leads 
me to call into question Keown’s decision to identify the virtues of Buddhism with one category alone, 
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The initial problem with which I opened this paper—namely, “what is the category 
of moral virtue in Buddhist ethics?”—is now superseded by a different kind of problem: 
Why do we find so many catalogs of virtues, why do they partially overlap, and why is 
it that none of them is fully exhaustive of the entire supply of Buddhist good qualities? 
The comparison explored above indicates that whereas the Western philosophical 
tradition of virtue ethics, with its many thinkers and scholars, described all virtuous 
qualities using a single term, aretê, in Buddhism we find numerous categories of virtues. 
I have mentioned sīla, a number of lists from the 37 factors that contribute to awakening, 
and the wholesome factors, but other categories that are frequently discussed may be 
added—for instance, the six perfections (pāramitā) of the Bodhisattva or the four 
divine abidings (brahma-vihāra). 10  It should be noted that none of them is fully 
exhaustive and that some are not even mutually exclusive, as they overlap other 
classifications. How is this profusion of lists to be explained? Why did the need arise 
to put together distinct catalogs of virtues, a tendency that cannot be traced in Western 
virtue theory? And why do different catalogs contain similar items? 
 
3. FROM BUDDHIST VIRTUES TO PLURALISM AND GRADUALISM 
 
The solution that I propose to this issue is based on two considerations. The first takes 
into account the functional relationship between moral virtues and living well 
presupposed by classical eudaimonistic virtue theories. The second concerns the place 
of the virtues and internal goods in MacIntyre’s idea of practices. First, recall that 
eudaimonistic theories see a close connection between the virtues and living well: 
essentially, the main reason for developing moral virtues is that living virtuously 
constitutes the state of living well. Given this connection, I would suggest that the 
linguistic distinction between different categories of virtues indicates a nuanced 
recognition of different categories of living well. One of the fundamental principles in 
the philosophy of language, as theorized by Wittgenstein and the Sapir–Whorf 
hypothesis, is that there is a direct relationship between the categories of our language 
and the ways in which we understand the world. A plurality of terms for describing a 
given phenomenon points to our ability to recognize distinct instances of it, uniqueness, 
and nuances, which requires different linguistic terms. On this interpretation, the 
multiplicity of terms for moral virtues suggests that the Buddhist tradition also 
acknowledges various conceptions of living well rather than a single idea. The virtues 
are classified under several categories because each set of virtues brings about its own 
 
10 It is compelling to view the four divine abidings as a catalog of virtues: Buddhaghosa explains that 
these mental states balance their “near” and “far” enemies (loving-kindness, for instance, balances greed 
and ill-will), demonstrating their emotionally corrective role (Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, IX.98–
101); they are dispositions which, when fully realized, color the moral agent’s life as a whole, 
encompassing dear ones, enemies, strangers, and the agent himself, without any qualifications (IX.8–
12); they are guided by and rooted in an understanding of reality, or wisdom (e.g., IX.38); and even 
etymologically, both brahma-vihāra, as explained by Buddhaghosa, and the Greek term aretê denote 
“excellence” (IX.106; MacIntyre 1981; 3rd edition 2007, 122–3). For relevant discussions of the four 
divine abidings, see Heim 2014; Heim 2020, 27–32; MacKenzie 2018a, 158–60; MacKenzie 2018b, 
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state of living well. The overlap between distinct catalogs that contain similar items is 
the natural result of different combinations of virtues being conducive to different 
modalities of living well.11 
This nuanced classification has a further and deeper ethical significance. The 
different sets of virtues are associated with different practices, in MacIntyre’s sense of 
the term, and this brings me to my second consideration. As mentioned above, practices 
are forms of socially established cooperative human activity. These activities prescribe 
standards of excellence and allow the practitioner to realize the goods internal to them. 
Additionally, practices involve human conceptions of ends and goods. Within this 
theoretical framework, virtues take on the meaning of acquired qualities which, through 
their possession and exercise, tend to enable the practitioner to achieve the goods that 
are internal to the practice. The frameworks in which the Buddhist sets of virtues are 
acquired and exercised, I would suggest, meet MacIntyre’s definition of a practice. 
Thus, the refined classification of virtues that is found in Buddhism is also indicative 
of a plurality of practices, each with their own ends, standards, and internal goods. 
To return to some of the categories of virtues mentioned above: each of them, 
according to Buddhist scriptures, enables the practitioner to realize a well-lived life, as 
the foremost benefit in an array of goods. Sīla creates the conditions for a life of success, 
which is characterized by a large fortune, a good reputation, freedom from fear in the 
company of others, an unconfused death, and consequently a happy rebirth in the 
heavenly realms (Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, I.23). Furthermore, the virtuous 
person’s actions bear much fruit; he is the object of honor and becomes renowned, he 
is free of mental afflictions, and, by being virtuous, he prevents future suffering (I.159). 
At the same time, the meditator who practices the four divine abidings will be reborn 
in the Brahmā world (brahma-loka) and will enjoy Brahmā’s companionship. Prior to 
that, the meditator will enjoy several other benefits:  
 
A man sleeps in comfort, wakes in comfort, and dreams no evil dreams, he is dear to human 
beings, he is dear to non-human beings, deities guard him, fire and poison and weapons do 
not affect him, his mind is easily concentrated, the expression of his face is serene, he dies 
unconfused. (IX.37)  
 
The seven members of awakening are, naturally, qualities by virtue of which Nibbāna 
is attained, and if we look beyond the eudaimonistic states of early Buddhism, then the 
six perfections of the Bodhisattva are virtues which pave the path to Buddhahood. 
Each of these practices is evaluated by standards of excellence defined by the 
community of practice. According to Buddhaghosa, among the measures for a cleansed 
 
11 Alternative explanations for the multiplicity of catalogs are possible. The variety we find may have 
resulted from a lack of theoretical ethical reflection on the part of Buddhist thinkers, which led to the 
absence of terminological and ideological uniformity (see Garfield 2008, par. 1–2; Keith 1923; 4th edition 
1963, 114; and Keown 2006, 46); alternatively, the classifications may have followed a different 
rationale, such as the analytical presentation of Buddhist teachings or philosophical ideas. My point is 
not that other considerations were not involved in the compilation of the lists that came down to us—
indeed, not all of the categories I mentioned have an equivalent eudaimonia—but rather that at least one 
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sīla are the complete non-breaking of the training precepts, the absence of the “seven 
bonds of sexuality”, the non-arising of negative states of mind, such as anger, envy, 
and pride, and the arising of positive qualities, such as fewness of wishes, contentment, 
and effacement (I.151). When the meditator excels in the practice of the four divine 
abidings, he should be able to break down the barriers between dear persons, neutral 
persons, hostile persons, and himself, and generate loving-kindness and so on towards 
all of them (IX.40, IX.81, IX.87, IX.89). Standards of excellence are also documented 
for the seven members of awakening. The sign of a cleansed concentration, for instance, 
is the “state partaking of distinction”, which is defined as the state in which the 
meditator is “accessible to perception and attention unaccompanied by applied thought” 
(III.26). Despite the different notions of living well and standards of exellence, these 
practices share several key features that are outlined in MacIntyre’s framework. The 
concepts of virtues that they employ are defined and explained by reference to the 
Buddhist understanding of suffering (dukkha) and the telos of liberation from it. 
Similarly, this telos and the accompanied goods flow from a Buddhist narrative that 
encompasses its etiology of the human predicament, a given cosmological system, and 
a description of spiritual progress and soteriology. 
What I wish to propose here is that we ought to take a broader view of Buddhist 
ethics which transcends the basic and rather intuitive equation of eudaimonia with 
Nibbāna (as proposed in Keown 1992 and Cooper and James 2005). Alongside the state 
of Nibbāna, the Buddhist tradition accepts other types of eudaimonia, such as rebirth 
in Brahmā world and a life of sīla, which are the good that ensues from a plurality of 
practices. This acceptance does not mean that all practices and types of living well are 
equal or that there is no hierarchy of values within them. Buddhaghosa clearly indicates 
that such a hierarchy exists.12 For instance, he evaluates Nibbāna as superior to sīla 
when he writes: “But once his virtue [sīla] is perfected, / His mind then seeks no other 
kind / Than the perfection of Nibbāna, / The state where utter peace prevails” (I.159). 
Although the virtuous life connected with the practice of sīla is fortunate and successful, 
it is still beset by suffering. Therefore, Nibbāna is more desirable. For similar reasons, 
Nibbāna is also evaluated higher than life in the Brahmā world, which results from the 
practice of divine abidings. When Buddhaghosa enumerates the benefits of cultivating 
the four virtues of divine abidings, he concludes with the final advantage for the 
meditator, saying that “if he penetrates no higher, he will be reborn in the Brahmā-
world” (IX.37). He then elucidates the last point: “If he penetrates no higher: if he is 
unable to reach higher than the attainment of loving-kindness and attain Arahantship, 
then when he falls from this life, he reappears in the Brahmā-world as one who wakes 
up from sleep” (IX.76). That is to say, for Buddhaghosa, Arahantship, the state of those 
who attain Nibbāna, is also superior to the wellbeing experienced in the Brahmā world. 
The kind of acceptance exemplified in this version of virtue ethics, then, does not 
consider all practices and modalities of living well to be equal. Rather, it reflects the 
 
12  This hierarchy is to be distinguished from a hierarchy of means to ends. By definition, these 
eudaimonias are all complete ends for the practitioner when he pursues one of them according to his 
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same pluralistic spirit that Buddhism displays towards people with different capacities, 
who are situated in different places along the spiritual path, when it admits a variety of 
practices and philosophical views according to their level of spiritual maturity. 
Adopting this pluralistic spirit, different people may benefit from participating in 
different practices and from working towards the realization of different visions of 
living well that are suited to their inclinations and capacities. Therefore, the multiplicity 
of catalogs of moral virtues in Buddhism testifies to a theory that is both pluralistic—
acknowledging multiple legitimate practices, conceptions of eudaimonia, and moral 
characters—and gradualist, evaluating the variety of practices, eudaimonias, and moral 
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